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CRYSTAL CLEAR VAGUENESS: THE BOARD OF 
IMMIGRATION HAMPERS JUSTICE WITH ITS 
VAGUE “PROCESS OF JUSTICE” 
By Maria Natera+ 
Immigration and deportation were the topics du jour in the last presidential 
election.1  Under the new administration, the number of immigration arrests and 
deportations have skyrocketed from the past administration, which also oversaw 
a notable increase in such proceedings.2  In an area of law that can have such 
drastic repercussions to the constitutional tenants of life and liberty, it is one that 
“lacks some of the most basic due process protections and checks and balances 
that we take for granted in our American system of justice.”3 
Due Process is a fundamental right that is enshrined within the United States 
Constitution.4  Every individual that falls under the jurisdiction of the United 
States is entitled to both procedural and substantive due process protections.5  
Those protections have developed in American jurisprudence since the creation 
of the nation.  One legal protection in this category holds that if a statute does 
not allow a person of reasonable intelligence to understand what he is and is not 
legally entitled to do, then that statute should be struck down for being 
unconstitutionally vague and reworked so that it fits a reasonableness standard.6 
                                                        
+ J.D., magna cum laude, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2019; 
B.B.A., The University of Texas at Austin, 2015.  The author would like to her family for their 
unwavering support, Francisco Hernandez for his feedback and guidance, and the Catholic 
University Law Review for its hard work and assistance in readying this paper for publication. 
 1. Dan Nowicki, Immigration at Front of 2016 Presidential Race, USA TODAY (May 15, 
2015, 9:39 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2015/05/15/immigration 
-2016-presidential-race/27360717/. 
 2. Maria Sacchetti, Immigration Arrests Soar under Trump; Sharpest Spike Seen for 
Noncriminals, WASH. POST (May 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration-
arrests-up-during-trump/2017/05/17/74399a04-3b12-11e7-9e48-
c4f199710b69_story.html?utm_term=.fab588d9919d. 
 3. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ENSURING FAIRNESS AND DUE PROCESS IN 
IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS 1, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/ 
priorities/immigration/2008dec_immigration.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 4. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 5. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“But once an alien enters the country, the 
legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United 
States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or 
permanent.”). 
 6. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (“[A] statute which either forbids 
or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning . . . violates the first essential of due process of law.”). 
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In the area of immigration law, the issue of unconstitutional vagueness has 
become more prominent in recent years,7 with the United States Supreme Court 
striking down as unconstitutional an immigration statute under the void-for-
vagueness doctrine.8  The Immigration and Nationality Act provides definitions 
for certain crimes that are grounds for legal immigrants to be placed in removal 
proceedings, with the possibility of deportation.9  With such severe potential 
consequences, it is crucial that the statutes be crystal clear on what every crime 
entails in order to give immigrants fair warning, a touchstone of the due process 
protections in this area.10 
One such crime that may subject an immigrant to removal proceedings and 
deportation is a conviction for an “aggravated felony,” coupled with a sentence 
of more than one year imprisonment.11  The definition of the crime includes, 
among other things, any offense involving “obstruction of justice.”12  Over the 
years the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which is generally the final 
arbiter and enforcer of immigration laws and oversees all appeals regarding 
removal proceedings,13 has created several different definitions of what crimes 
constitute “obstruction of justice.”14  This comment will analyze these varying 
definitions, and discuss how they can be used to improve upon the most recent 
“obstruction of justice” definition provided by the BIA. 
Most recently, in Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, the BIA defined “obstruction 
of justice” as any “specific intent to interfere with the process of justice,” and as 
such, no requirement of an ongoing criminal proceeding or investigation is 
needed.15  The BIA did not fully define what “process of justice” entails.16  The 
Ninth Circuit correctly held that this definition was unconstitutionally vague, 
and if it had been allowed to stand, could potentially allow almost any specific 
intent crime to be included under this category.17  However, the Ninth Circuit 
                                                        
 7. See Jennifer Lee Koh, Crimmigration and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 2016 WIS. 
L. REV. 1127, 1128 (2016) (discussing recent immigration cases dealing with unconstitutional 
vagueness issues). 
 8. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223 (2017). 
 9. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012). 
 10. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (stating that vague laws have 
the ability to trap innocent people when a fair warning is not provided). 
 11. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (An “alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony 
at any time after admission is deportable.”). 
 12. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). 
 13. Exec. Office of Immigration Reform, Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
 14. See Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 813–14 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(comparing the BIA’s prior interpretations of “obstruction of justice” with its most recent). 
 15. Id. at 812. 
 16. Id. at 819. 
 17. Id. at 822. 
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remanded the case, and instructed the BIA to attempt to rework the definition, 
providing no additional guidance as to what the definition should be.18 
Part I of this comment explains the relevant background of the void-for 
vagueness doctrine.  It delves into the historical use of the doctrine in Supreme 
Court cases involving convictions of criminal law statutes in combination with 
civil immigration provisions that can lead to removal and deportation 
proceedings, as well as its modern-day challenges.  Additionally, Part I discusses 
Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, and the various definitions of “obstruction of 
justice” the BIA has created over time.  Finally, Part I discusses the Sessions v. 
Dimaya decision, which was recently decided by the Supreme Court of the 
United States, and its potential effects on the void-for-vagueness doctrine in this 
area of law.  Part II compares the past “obstruction of justice” definitions, with 
the most current one discussed in Valenzuela Gallardo, explains the possible 
ramifications of allowing the current definition to stand, and discusses the 
heightened need to protect due process requirements for non-citizens. 
Finally, Part III argues that the BIA should in fact include a temporal nexus 
requirement to the definition of “obstruction of justice,” in order to eliminate 
any unconstitutional vagueness issues.  While the Ninth Circuit refrained from 
holding that the BIA should include such a nexus,19 the requirement would be in 
line with the definition of obstruction of justice crimes found in standard 
criminal law.20  Additionally, it would help resolve the issue of vagueness, by 
narrowing the scope of crimes included.  This, in turn, would provide necessary 
constitutional notice and satisfy the due process constitutional protection 
afforded to every person in the United States.  This Comment concludes that 
when dealing with non-citizens, who are generally under-protected within the 
law, the Constitution demands the most rigorous application of constitutional 
safeguards, and as such, the “obstruction of justice” definition is especially 
lacking. 
I. CRIMINAL IMMIGRATION LAW’S VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS PROBLEM 
A. Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine 
The United States Supreme Court famously noted: 
                                                        
 18. Id. at 824. 
 19. Id. at 822. 
 20. Obstruction of Justice, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 2012).  Obstruction of 
Justice is defined as: 
 [A] broad term for conduct that interferes with any aspect of the system of justice, 
including any act that interferes with or endeavors to interfere with: an investigation, 
prosecution, administrative process, or trial; the police, agencies, prosecutors, or courts; 
their personnel or offices; or the witnesses, parties, or evidence that may be relevant to 
such proceedings. 
Id. 
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Vagueness doctrine is an outgrowth…of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment.  A conviction fails to comport with due process 
if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of 
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so 
standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory 
enforcement.21 
For more than 125 years, the Supreme Court has stricken criminal statutes as 
being unconstitutionally vague,22 and over that time, the doctrine has come to be 
considered “among the most important guarantees of liberty under the law.”23 
The doctrine itself can be implicated for one of two reasons.24  The first deals 
with notice, a requirement of the Due Process Clause.25  A criminal statute will 
be held unconstitutionally vague “if it fails to provide people of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits.”26  
This gives people the ability to adjust their behavior in order to conform to the 
requirements as set out in the law.27  As such, a criminal statute should be 
unambiguous, as “[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to 
speculate as to the meaning.”28  It should provide “relatively clear guidelines”29 
that outline what conduct is prohibited, and set forth “objective criteria”30 to 
assess whether the statute has been violated. 
The second reason that a criminal statute may be held unconstitutionally 
vague is “if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.”31  The concern with such a statute is that it would impermissibly 
delegate basic policy matters to law enforcement, judges, and juries on a 
subjective basis, resulting in possible arbitrary and discriminatory application.32  
Thus, a statute must “provide explicit standards for those who apply them”33 in 
order to avoid an unconstitutional vagueness issue. 
                                                        
 21. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 
703, 732 (2000)). 
 22. Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited, 
30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 280 (2003). 
 23. Id. (quoting CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 102 
(1996)). 
 24. Hill, 530 U.S. at 732 (discussing that a statute may be impermissibly vague if, first, people 
of normal intelligence cannot understand the conduct it prohibits and, second, if it allows for 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement). 
 25. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979). 
 26. Hill, 530 U.S. at 732 (citing Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56–57 (1999)). 
 27. Morales, 527 U.S. at 58 (discussing the purpose of the fair notice requirement). 
 28. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). 
 29. Posters ‘N’ Things v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 525 (1994). 
 30. Id. at 526. 
 31. Hill, 530 U.S. at 732 (citing Morales, 527 U.S. at 56–57). 
 32. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972). 
 33. Id. at 108. 
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B. Going Up: Supreme Court Tackles Possible Vagueness Issues in 
Immigration Law 
The Supreme Court has unequivocally held that any foreign national within 
the jurisdiction of the United States is entitled to the protections of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment.34  However, it has yet 
to strike down an immigration provision, using the void-for-vagueness analysis 
discussed above, in connection with a removal proceeding.35  Despite this fact, 
in recent years, the use of the void-for-vagueness doctrine has skyrocketed in 
the intersection of criminal law and immigration law.36  However, this is not the 
first time the doctrine has appeared in that context, as the Supreme Court 
addressed this concern twice before.37  Most recently, the Court decided a case 
that upheld a constitutional challenge on the basis of vagueness to an 
immigration provision, causing the provision to be struck down.38 
1. Emergence of Vagueness in Immigration Case Law 
The earliest case that dealt with the possibility of unconstitutional vagueness 
in a federal immigration statute was the Supreme Court’s 1951 decision in 
Jordan v. De George.39  In that case, the Court analyzed a statute declaring an 
Italian immigrant potentially deportable for a conviction of a “crime involving 
moral turpitude.”40  De George had been previously convicted of conspiracy to 
defraud the United States of taxes on distilled spirits on two separate occasions.41  
He was placed in removal proceedings while serving his second sentence.42  
Despite the fact that neither party actually raised nor argued the issue of 
vagueness,43  and despite the fact that the statute itself was an immigration 
                                                        
 34. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (“[A]ll persons within the 
territory of the United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed by [the Fifth and Sixth] 
amendments, and that even aliens shall not…be deprived of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law.”). 
 35. See Kara Goad & Elizabeth Sullivan, Supreme Court Bulletin: Sessions 
v. Dimaya, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/15-1498 (last visited Mar. 
17, 2019).  Since removal proceedings are generally considered to be civil penalties, there has been 
some discussion as to whether the same void-for-vagueness analysis used in criminal proceedings, 
as protected by the Fifth Amendment, applies in civil cases as well.  In Sessions v. Dimaya, the 
Supreme Court ended such discussion by affirming that the void-for vagueness analysis applies to 
removal proceedings in the same way it applies to any other proceeding.  Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 
S. Ct. 1204 (2018). 
 36. Koh, supra note 7, at 1128. 
 37. See discussion infra Part B.1. 
 38. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1223 (striking down a statutory clause that “produces more 
unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates”). 
 39. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (discussing whether a fraud conspiracy 
against the United States is a crime involving moral turpitude under the Immigration Act of 1917). 
 40. Id. at 224–26. 
 41. Id. at 226. 
 42. Id. at 225. 
 43. Id. at 228. 
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provision rather than a criminal statute,44 the Supreme Court, sua sponte, went 
through the two-step analysis of the vagueness doctrine.45  The Court found that 
the two-step test was satisfied, and that the statute at issue was not 
unconstitutionally vague.46 
In 1967, the Supreme Court heard Boutilier v. INS, its second case dealing 
with vagueness in the immigration law context.47  The provision at issue in that 
case prohibited entry into the United States to individuals “afflicted with 
psychopathic personality.”48  At the time, homosexuals were considered to be 
afflicted with psychopathic personality.49  Since the petitioner had previously 
engaged in “homosexual relations,”50 he was deemed to be afflicted with a 
“psychopathic personality” and as a result, was subsequently deported.51  A 
challenge to the statute was then raised, alleging that the term “psychopathic 
personality” was unconstitutionally vague.52  The challenge was subsequently 
struck down, with the Court finding that the legislative history made it explicitly 
clear that homosexual relations were included in the phrase “psychopathic 
personality.”53 
2. Modern Day Vagueness in Immigration Case Law 
The Supreme Court’s denial of the vagueness challenges to the immigration 
statutes in both cases remained the standard for many years.54  However, a recent 
Supreme Court case involving the vagueness doctrine outside of the immigration 
law context paved the way for a wider acceptance of immigration provisions 
                                                        
 44. Id. at 231. 
 45. Id. at 231–32.  The analysis itself involved determining “whether the language conveys 
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common 
understanding and practices.”  Id.  See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) 
(stating that statutes that define terms “so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the . . . due process [clause]). 
 46. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 232. 
 47. See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (addressing the case of an alien who was 
deported on the basis of his homosexuality under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. at 120 (noting the “Public Health Service issued a certificate” that the petitioner 
had a psychopathic personality and was a “sexual deviate at the time of his admission”). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 118. 
 52. Id. at 123. 
 53. Id. at 120 (explaining that “[t]he legislative history of the Act indicates beyond a shadow 
of a doubt that the Congress intended the phrase ‘psychopathic personality’ to include 
homosexuals.”). 
 54. Id. at 122 (finding that “Congress used the phrase ‘psychopathic personality’ not in 
the clinical sense, but to effectuate its purpose to exclude from entry all homosexuals and other sex 
perverts.”); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (holding that “[w]hatever else the 
phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ may mean in peripheral cases, the decided cases make it 
plain that crimes in which fraud was an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral 
turpitude.”). 
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being found to be unconstitutionally vague.  In that case, Johnson v. United 
States, the Court assessed the Armed Career Criminal Act’s “residual clause” 
for vagueness.55 
The Act itself included a definition of “violent felony,” that listed several 
offenses.56  If a person were convicted of any of the listed offenses three or more 
times, the Act would automatically increase a person’s prison term to a 
minimum of 15 years and a maximum of life.57  The “residual clause” included 
in the category of  “violent felony,” any crime that “otherwise involves conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”58 
Through its analysis of the residual clause, the Supreme Court held it was 
unconstitutionally vague. 59   The Court found that there were two specific 
features of the residual clause that made it unconstitutionally vague.60  First, it 
was found that the residual clause left “grave uncertainty about how to estimate 
the risk posed by a crime.”61  The second issue the Court had with the residual 
clause was that it left uncertainty regarding the amount of risk it would take for 
the crime to qualify as a violent felony.62  As the Supreme Court noted, “[b]y 
combining indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime with 
indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent 
felony, the residual clause produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than 
the Due Process Clause tolerates.”63 
In its holding the Court broadened the doctrine of void-for-vagueness, stating 
that in contradiction to prior narrow holdings by the Supreme Court, “a vague 
provision is [not] constitutional merely because there is some conduct that 
clearly falls within the provision’s grasp.”64  The holding provided an opening 
for courts throughout the nation to more readily accept the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine as a successful challenge within the criminal and immigration law 
cross-section, which was used in a recent Supreme Court case.65 
                                                        
 55. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
 56. Id. at 2555–56.  Other offenses included “burglary, arson, [] extortion, [or crimes] 
involv[ing the] use of explosives.”  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 57. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2555. 
 58. Id. at 2555–56 (quoting § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). 
 59. Id. at 2557.  The Supreme Court stated that the “residual clause leaves uncertainty about 
how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.”  Id. at 2558. 
 60. Id. at 2557. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 2557–58. 
 63. Id. at 2558. 
 64. Id. at 2560–61.  “It is one thing to apply an imprecise ’serious potential risk’ standard to 
real-world facts; it is quite another to apply it to a judge-imagined abstraction.”  Id. at 2558. 
 65.  Koh, supra note 7, at 1152–53 (commenting that “[b]y broadening the scope of the 
vagueness doctrine, Johnson provides an impetus for courts to reconsider how void for vagueness 
challenges should fair in the immigration context.”). 
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Sessions v. Dimaya66 presented the Supreme Court its first case in over fifty 
years that dealt with the intersection of immigration provisions and the void-for-
vagueness doctrine.  In it, the Supreme Court used the Johnson decision to strike 
down an immigration provision using the doctrine of void-for-vagueness.67  In 
Dimaya, the petitioner sought review as a result of his conviction of a “crime of 
violence,”68 which triggered his eligibility for removal proceedings.69   Dimaya 
had previously been convicted of first-degree residential burglary on two 
separate occasions.70  He claimed that the crime of burglary did not fall under 
the category of “crime of violence,” and that the statute should be struck down 
for being unconstitutionally vague.71 
Citing the Johnson decision, and using the vagueness doctrine analysis, the 
Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit and held that the statute at hand 
was in fact unconstitutionally vague and struck it down.72  The Court reasoned 
that the “substantial risk” element found in the definition of “crime of violence” 
was too indeterminate to give proper notice as to how much risk was substantial 
enough to constitute such a crime.73  However, the Court explained that the issue 
with the “substantial risk” element alone would not render the statute 
unconstitutional.74  It also pointed out that, as in Johnson, the statute itself did 
not offer any parameters as to what an “ordinary case” that violated the statue 
would look like.75  Those two factors combined resulted in the residual clause 
of the statute in Dimaya to be deemed unconstitutional under the void-for-
vagueness doctrine.76 
As a result of the decision in Dimaya, courts now have a clearer path to finding 
immigration statutes unconstitutionally vague.77  Given the increased attention 
                                                        
 66. See generally Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (addressing the immigration 
status of a permanent United States resident who had been convicted of burglary). 
 67. Id. at 1223. 
 68. Id. at 1211.  The “crime of violence” definition is found in immigration provision 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(F); it is one of a long list of crimes under the “aggravated felony” category.  Id. 
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2012)). 
 69. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1210–11.  It triggers deportation removal proceedings for a non-
citizen if they are also sentenced for a term of imprisonment of more than one year.  8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012). 
 70. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1211. 
 71. Id. at 1211–12. 
 72. Id. at 1223. 
 73. Id. at 1214–15.  The section of the definition for “crime of violence” at issue is as follows: 
“(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical 
force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the 
offense.”  Id. at 1211 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012) which defines “crime of violence”). 
 74. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1215. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1216, 1223. 
 77. See id. at 1223 (comparing an immigration statute from the instant case to a criminal 
statute which required mandatory minimum prison sentences and was determined to be 
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to immigration and deportation issues, as well as the increase in deportation 
rates, the case is sure to have a significant impact on the criminal and 
immigration law landscape and beyond. 
C. Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch: Unconstitutional Vagueness and 
Immigration Collide 
1. Facts and Procedural History 
Another case from the Ninth Circuit involving a vagueness challenge to an 
immigration provision is Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch.78  Valenzuela Gallardo, 
a citizen of Mexico, was granted lawful permanent residency to the United States 
in 2002.79  He was arrested and charged in California on several counts in 
November 2007, but all charges were dismissed except for one count of 
accessory to a felony, to which he pled guilty. 80   Valenzuela Gallardo was 
initially placed on probation but later violated its terms, and as a result, was 
given a sixteen-month prison sentence.81 
As a result of the conviction and prison sentence, Valenzuela Gallardo was 
placed in removal proceedings in June 2010.82  The proceedings were initiated 
because the Government argued that Valenzuela Gallardo’s conviction of 
accessory to a felony constituted an “offense relating to obstruction of justice.”83  
Such an offense would also qualify as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(S), 84  and made Valenzuela Gallardo eligible for placement in 
removal proceedings.85  A motion to terminate removal proceedings was filed in 
July 2010, and Valenzuela Gallardo contested removability.86  He argued that 
his conviction of accessory to a felony 87  was not an offense “relating to 
                                                        
unconstitutionally vague in its instant holding that the immigration statute was unconstitutionally 
vague). 
 78. Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  Valenzuela Gallardo had been discovered in a stolen vehicle that contained drugs and 
a firearm.  Id.  The dismissed charges included “two counts of possession of a controlled substance 
. . . , one count of possessing methamphetamine while armed . . . , and one count of failing to 
comply with the terms of his probation.”  Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 811–12. 
 84. Id. at 812.  The statute is also referred to as the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  
INA § 1101(a)(43)(S) (2012). 
 85. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 811–12. 
 86. Id. at 812. 
 87. Id.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 32 (West 1935): 
Every person who, after a felony has been committed, harbors, conceals or aids a 
principal in such felony, with the intent that said principal may avoid or escape from 
arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having knowledge that said principal has 
committed such felony or has been charged with such felony or convicted thereof, is an 
accessory to such felony. 
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obstruction of justice,” since the “federal ‘Obstruction of Justice’ ground must 
relate to an” ongoing judicial proceeding.88 
The motion to terminate removal proceedings was denied by the immigration 
judge overseeing the removal proceedings,89 who determined that a conviction 
under the California statute did constitute an “offense relating to obstruction of 
justice.”90  The judge noted that the BIA had not “limited the scope of the 
obstruction of justice aggravated felony to cases in which there is a pending 
judicial proceeding.” 91   The judge then ordered Valenzuela Gallardo to be 
“removed to Mexico.”92  The order was appealed to the BIA, who dismissed it.93 
Valenzuela Gallardo then petitioned for review to the federal courts, and 
requested a stay of his removal order.94  However, the Ninth Circuit originally 
dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction.95  The Board of Immigration 
Appeals reopened Valenzuela Gallardo’s proceedings sua sponte,96 in response 
to the Ninth Circuit’s Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder97 decision that created a 
new definition for the “obstruction of justice” offense in the immigration 
provision at issue. 98   In its further consideration of Valenzuela Gallardo’s 
removal order as a result of the Hoang case, the BIA’s three-judge panel created 
a new definition for the crime of “obstruction of justice.”99  In creating the 
definition, the BIA determined that an offense for “obstruction of justice” solely 
requires: 
[T]he affirmative and intentional attempt, with specific intent, to 
interfere with the process of justice . . . .  While many crimes fitting 
this definition will involve interference with an ongoing criminal 
investigation or trial, we now clarify that the existence of such 
                                                        
Id. 
 88. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812. 
 89. Id. (reasoning that the Board of Immigration “had previously held that the federal crime 
of accessory after the fact . . . is an aggravated felony.”). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  Despite the fact that the BIA is the highest administrative body for enforcing and 
interpreting immigration laws, an individual is allowed to appeal to the Federal District Court if 
their petition to the BIA is denied, and their challenge is based on legal or constitutional grounds. 
Immigration Law Appeals, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/immigration/appeals/ (last visited Mar. 
3, 2019). 
 95. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir 2011) (holding a crime 
constitutes an obstruction of justice “when it interferes with an ongoing proceeding or 
investigation” where the court considered two prior BIA decisions). 
 98. See discussion infra Part D. 
 99. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812 (citing Trung Thanh Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1164). 
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proceedings is not an essential element of an “offense relating to 
obstruction of justice.”100 
Using that definition, the three-judge panel found that the California statue under 
which Valenzuela Gallardo was convicted is “properly classified” as an 
“obstruction of justice” offense,101 and dismissed the reopened appeal.102 
2. Ninth Circuit’s Opinion: Unconstitutionally Vague 
Following the denial, Valenzuela Gallardo once again petitioned the Ninth 
Circuit for review.103  Finding that there was jurisdiction,104 the court granted 
the petition.105  The Ninth Circuit subsequently held that the new construction 
of “obstruction of justice” created by the BIA, specifically the phrase “process 
of justice,” was unconstitutionally vague.106  In coming to this conclusion, the 
Ninth Circuit assessed whether deference was owed to the BIA’s definition,107 
and most importantly, whether the definition was in fact unconstitutionally 
vague.108 
In determining whether deference was owed, the Ninth Circuit concluded, 
“where an agency’s interpretation of a statute raises grave constitutional 
concerns, and where Congress has not clearly indicated it intends a 
constitutionally suspect interpretation, [the Court could] assume Congress did 
not delegate authority for the interpretation[.]”109  Given that, the Ninth Circuit 
first had to determine whether any grave constitutional concerns arose out of the 
BIA’s newest construction of the definition of “obstruction of justice.”110 
In analyzing possible vagueness in the new interpretation of “obstruction of 
justice,” the Ninth Circuit took particular issue with the phrase “process of 
                                                        
 100. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812.  See In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 
838, 841 (B.I.A. 2012). 
 101. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812; Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I & N. Dec. at 841. 
 102. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), which provides the circumstances under which the 
federal courts can review decisions involving orders of removal). 
 105. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 825. 
 106. Id. at 812, 824. 
 107. Id. at 815 (using the Chevron doctrine, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether deference was 
owed to the BIA’s interpretation for “obstruction of justice,” as it is the highest administrative body 
for interpreting and applying immigration law).  The doctrine itself holds that if there is a binding 
agency precedent, courts should generally defer to that precedent as long as two requirements are 
met: 1) “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue” and the statute does not 
“unambiguously bar” an agency’s interpretation, and 2) whether the “BIA’s interpretation is ‘based 
on a permissible construction of the statute.’”  Id. 
 108. Id. at 819–22. 
 109. Id. at 818.  In coming to this conclusion, the court applied the constitutional avoidance 
and constitutional narrowing doctrines, which in the context of the Chevron doctrine, allowed the 
court to refuse to “accord deference to agency interpretations that raise grave constitutional doubts 
where other permissible and less troubling interpretations exist.”  Id. at 817. 
 110. Id. at 818–19. 
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justice” within the definition. 111   It stated that because the BIA gave no 
indication as to what was included within the phrase, or where that process 
begins or ends, the new phrase was unconstitutionally vague.112   The court 
analogized the phrase “process of justice” to the residual clause of the Armed 
Career Criminal Act in the Supreme Court’s Johnson decision, which was held 
unconstitutionally vague.113 
Like the residual clause in the Johnson case, which involved a great degree of 
uncertainty as to the amount of risk needed to qualify as a violent felony, the 
new construction including “process of justice” also left a great amount of 
uncertainty regarding what was included within the “process of justice” phrase, 
especially if there was no requirement of an ongoing criminal investigation or 
trial.114  The uncertainty was exacerbated by the lack of a definition for “process 
of justice” in any of the BIA’s prior case law.115 
The court found that the uncertainty created by the phrase “process of justice” 
left it unable to determine exactly what specific intent crimes qualified,116 noting 
that almost any specific intent crime could be included.117  Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the BIA’s new interpretation for “obstruction of justice” was 
unconstitutionally vague as a result of its use of the phrase “process of justice,” 
and its lack of any additional guidance as to what the phrase includes.118 
Finally, since the court determined that the new interpretation created serious 
constitutional doubts, it also had to assess whether Congress “made it clear that 
it chooses the constitutionally doubtful interpretation.”119  It held that there was 
no indication that Congress intended such an interpretation, given that its 
examples of obstruction of justice either are connected to an ongoing proceeding 
or investigation, or have some additional specificity that provides notice.120  As 
                                                        
 111. Id. at 819. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 819.  See also discussion supra Part 2. 
 114. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 819–20.  The court also looked to the other obstruction 
related crimes listed in the statute that qualified as “aggravated felonies” and found that they both 
were tied to ongoing criminal proceedings.  Id. at 821. 
 115. Id. at 820.  The court noted that there was no definition of “process of justice” within the 
INA’s definition section.  Id.  It also cited Black’s Law Dictionary to show that there was no 
definition for “process of justice” within it.  Id. 
 116. Id. (explaining that “[a]bsent some indication of the contours of ‘process of justice,’ an 
unpredictable variety of specific intent crimes could fall within it, leaving us unable to determine 
what crimes make a criminal defendant deportable…and what crimes do not.”).  The court was also 
concerned about the possibility of the new interpretation inviting arbitrary enforcement, which 
could result in defense attorneys unable to accurately advise their clients.  Id. at 820–21. 
 117. Id. at 820.  The court further noted, “[i]t is difficult to imagine a specific intent crime that 
could not be swept into the BIA’s expanded definition.”  Id. at 822. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 823. 
 120. Id.  The court also explained that catchall provisions in a federal criminal obstruction of 
justice provision have been construed by courts as requiring a connection to an ongoing criminal 
proceeding or trial: 
2019] Crystal Clear Vagueness 745 
a result, the Ninth Circuit did not defer to the BIA’s interpretation, and remanded 
the appeal to the BIA, instructing it to offer a new construction to the definition 
of “obstruction of justice,” or alternatively, apply a previously used 
interpretation that complied with the constitutional requirements for due 
process.121 
D. The BIA’s Past Constructions of “Obstruction of Justice” 
One of the earliest constructions of “obstruction of justice” referenced by the 
Ninth Circuit in Valenzuela Gallardo122 is the one found in the BIA’s decision 
in In re Batista-Hernandez.123  In determining whether the federal offense of 
accessory after the fact fell under the umbrella of “obstruction of justice” crimes, 
as outlined in § 1101(a)(43)(S),124 the BIA had only a cursory discussion.125  It 
concluded that the offense qualified as “obstruction of justice,” and in turn an 
aggravated felony, because the statute “criminalizes actions knowingly taken to 
‘hinder or prevent [another’s] apprehension, trial, or punishment.’”126 
Two years later, the BIA released a differing, and more descriptive, 
construction for “obstruction of justice” in In re Espinoza-Gonzalez.127  In that 
case, Espinoza-Gonzalez was a citizen of Mexico, who had gained legal resident 
status in the United States.128  He was convicted of the offense of misprision of 
a felony, which was categorized as an offense constituting “obstruction of 
justice.”129   Espinoza-Gonzalez was placed in removal proceedings.130   The 
immigration judge presiding over the case found that the offense that Espinoza-
Gonzalez was convicted of did not constitute an “obstruction of justice” 
offense.131  The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) appealed the 
                                                        
Recent decisions of Courts of Appeals have likewise tended to place metes and bounds 
on the very broad language of the catchall provision.  The action taken by the accused 
must be with an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings…if the defendant 
lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding, he lacks the 
requisite intent to obstruct. 
Id. (quoting United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995)). 
 121. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 824. 
 122. Id. at 813. 
 123. See In re Batista-Hernandez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 955 (B.I.A. 1997) (noting that “the wording 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3 itself indicates its relation to obstruction of justice” and discussing “the nature of 
being an accessory after the fact”). 
 124. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 813. 
 125. Batista-Hernandez, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 961.  The other explanation for its holding was “the 
nature of being an accessory after the fact lies essentially in obstructing justice and preventing the 
arrest of the offender.”  Id. at 962. 
 126. Id. at 962 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3 (1993)). 
 127. See In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 128. Id. at 890. 
 129. Id. at 889–90 (stating the statute under which he was convicted is 18 U.S.C.S. § 4). 
 130. Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 890. 
 131. Id. at 892 (explaining that the immigration judge found that the statutory language for 
misprision of a felony did not directly relate to obstruction of justice). 
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decision to the BIA.132  Despite INS’s arguments, the BIA agreed with the 
immigration judge.133 
In reaching that conclusion, the BIA looked to “obstruction of justice” 
offenses in the federal criminal statutes.134  It explained that those “obstruction 
of justice” offenses “have as an element interference with the proceedings of a 
tribunal or require an intent to harm or retaliate against others who cooperate in 
the process of justice or might otherwise so cooperate.”135  The BIA also noted 
“[i]t is a lesser offense to conceal a crime where there is no investigation or 
proceeding.”136  Additionally, it specifically mentioned that the Supreme Court 
narrowly construes a catchall provision found in the federal “obstruction of 
justice” statutes.137  The BIA specifically quoted the Supreme Court: 
The action taken by the accused must be with an intent to influence 
judicial or grand jury proceedings; it is not enough that there be an 
intent to influence some ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation 
independent of the Court’s or grand jury’s authority . . . .  In other 
words, the endeavor must have the “natural and probable effect” of 
interfering with the due administration of justice . . . .   If the defendant 
lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial 
proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct.138 
Using those federal statutes, the BIA thus held that the offense at issue in 
Espinoza-Gonzalez, having none of the limiting elements (i.e., interference in an 
ongoing investigation or proceeding), did not rise to the necessary level to 
warrant it being classified as an “obstruction of justice” crime.139 
It was to this narrower construction that the Ninth Circuit had previously 
deferred to on three separate occasions.140  The most recent case illustrating this 
                                                        
 132. Id. at 889. 
 133. Id. at 892 (finding that “the elements of the offense of misprision of a felony do not 
constitute the crime of obstruction of justice as that term is defined in the United States Code.”). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. (noting the court specifically looked at the obstruction of justice offenses listed in 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1501–1518). 
 136. Id. at 895. 
 137. Id. at 892.  The BIA quoted from a Supreme Court case discussing the catchall provision 
that prohibited a “person who ‘corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or 
communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct or impede, 
the due administration of justice’” found in 18 U.S.C. § 1503.  Id. 
 138. Id. (citing United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598–99 (1995) (making false statements 
to an investigating agent who would potentially testify at a grand jury proceeding was not sufficient 
to constitute an obstruction of justice crime)). 
 139. Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 896. 
 140. See Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2011); Salazar-Luviano 
v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 2008) (deferring to the Espinoza-Gonzalez construction 
of “obstruction of justice” when determining if aiding and abetting the attempted escape from 
custody constitutes an aggravated felony); Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076, 1086–87 
(9th Cir. 2008) (using the Espinoza-Gonzalez definition of “obstruction of justice” to conclude that 
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deference by the court was its decision in Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder,141 
where a Vietnamese citizen and permanent resident of the United States was 
convicted of rendering criminal assistance in the second degree. 142   In its 
reasoning, the Ninth Circuit referenced back to one of their prior decisions 
stating, “Espinoza-Gonzalez ‘articulated both an actus reus and mens rea 
element of the generic definition of [obstruction of justice] crimes for purposes 
of § 1101(a)(43)(S).’”143 
Since it determined the construction of “obstruction of justice” in Espinoza-
Gonzalez, was reasonable,144 the court used those elements to determine that the 
conviction lacked the “necessary actus reus” and therefore did not constitute 
“obstruction of justice.”145  It is with these prior constructions in mind that the 
Ninth Circuit disapproved of the BIA’s most recent definition of “obstruction of 
justice” in its In re Valenzuela Gallardo decision.146 
II. WHICH IS BEST? COMPETING CONSTRUCTIONS FOR OBSTRUCTION OF 
JUSTICE 
A. Comparing the Narrow and Broad Approaches to “Obstruction of Justice” 
As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, it appears that the newest construction of 
“obstruction of justice” created by the BIA in In re Valenzuela-Gallardo departs 
from its prior interpretations.147  The constructions can generally be categorized 
into two approaches: a narrower construction, as seen in the most recent 
decision, and a broader construction, to which the court has deferred to on 
several occasions.148 
                                                        
a failure to appear in court in violation of federal criminal provision qualified as an obstruction of 
justice). 
 141. Trung Thanh Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1161 (stating “[i]n light of our precedent, we look to 
Espinoza-Gonzalez to supply the definition of the generic federal obstruction of justice offense.”). 
 142. Id. at 1159. 
 143. Id. at 1161.  See also Renteria-Morales, 551 F.3d at 1086 (quoting Espinoza-Gonzalez, 
22 I. & N. Dec. at 893) (discussing actus reus as “either active interference with proceedings of a 
tribunal or investigation, or action or threat of action against those who would cooperate in the 
process of justice”)).  Furthermore, it described mens rea as “specific intent to interfere with the 
process of justice.”  Renteria-Morales, 551 F.3d at 1086 (quoting Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. 
Dec. at 893). 
 144. Trung Thanh Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1161.  The Court also determined that it did not need to 
defer to the BIA’s conclusion that a particular crime is removable offense, only to its definitions of 
ambiguous terms.  Id. at 1163.  Additionally, it pointed out that if the BIA is dealing with the 
interpretation of a state criminal statute, since it is not a matter “committed to the BIA’s 
expertise[,]” the court owed “no deference to the BIA’s resolution of [that] question.”  Id. 
 145. Id. at 1165. 
 146. Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 813–14, 816 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 147. Id. at 813 (stating “[t]he BIA’s most recent interpretation departs from its prior 
interpretations.”). 
 148. Id. at 814; see discussion infra Part A.1. 
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1. Espinoza-Gonzalez: Broad “Obstruction” Construction 
The older construction created by the BIA in its Espinoza-Gonzalez decision 
is more expansive and detailed than the subsequent definition of “obstruction of 
justice.”149  The elements included in the definition were an actus reus, active 
interference with proceedings, and mens rea, specific intent to interfere with the 
process of justice,150 providing more clarity than the preceding construction 
given in Batista-Hernandez.151  By explicitly stating that an offense constitutes 
obstruction of justice if there is specific intent to interfere with the process of 
justice and there must be active interference with criminal proceedings, the 
construction gives constitutional due process notice to an individual as to what 
crimes would fall into this category.152 
2. In re Valenzuela-Gallardo: Narrow “Obstruction” Construction 
Despite the prior construction passing constitutional muster, the BIA changed 
the construction of “obstruction of justice” in the In re Valenzuela-Gallardo 
decision. 153   It eliminated completely the actus reus element as delineated 
previously.154  This meant that any specific intent crime that interfered with the 
“process of justice” would fall under that category. 155   However, without 
defining what “process of justice” entails, and without any further actus reus, the 
construction is unconstitutionally vague, and fails due process requirements, as 
it creates an issue of lack of fair notice, and the potential for arbitrary 
enforcement.156 
Without the actus reus qualification, any reasonable person would have to 
guess as to which of his specific intent actions did interfere with the “process of 
justice,” which goes against the very basic tenants of the constitutional void-for-
vagueness doctrine. 157   Furthermore, the lack of definition for “process of 
                                                        
 149. Id. at 824 (referencing the construction found in Espinoza-Gonzalez as the broader 
definition in relation to the newer “obstruction of justice” definition). 
 150. Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076, 1086 (2016). 
 151. See generally In re Batista-Hernandez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 955 (B.I.A. 1997) (determining 
that a conviction of a controlled substance does not establish deportability). 
 152. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 
703, 732 (2000)). 
 153. In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 838, 841 (B.I.A. 2012). 
 154. Id. (clarifying that there is no requirement for the existence of an ongoing criminal 
proceeding in “obstruction of justice” offenses). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 819 (9th Cir. 2016).  As pointed out by the 
Ninth Circuit, when the Government made the unsatisfying argument that the specific intent 
requirement narrowed the scope of the definition, the crucial question of “specific intent to do 
what?” was still left open.  Id. at 821.  Furthermore, it explained that despite the fact that the statute 
defined what intent (“mens rea”) was needed, it provided “little instruction on the equally important 
actus reus.”  Id. 
 157. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (noting “the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary 
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justice” means that the determination of what falls within that broad category is 
left wholly to the discretion of the court.  This results in arbitrary enforcement, 
as one court may feel that a crime qualifies, while another disagrees. 
B. Susceptibility to Due Process Concerns: Immigrants and Immigration Law 
The field of immigration law has been compared to a game of “roulette,”158 
and described as an area where “the normal rules of constitutional law simply 
do not apply.”159  As a result, immigration laws culminate in the individuals it 
affects being especially at risk of the problems that underlie the void-for-
vagueness doctrine: lack of notice and arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.160  The punishments for non-citizens, namely deportation and bar 
to entry, are extremely severe,161 so the fact that many of these constitutional 
safeguards are seemingly weaker in this area should elicit grave concerns all the 
more. 
1. Lack of Fair Notice 
The first concern is that of constitutional notice, and whether a reasonable 
person would understand what conduct conforms to the law, and what does 
not. 162   As such, statutes are supposed to be unambiguous. 163   Even then, 
individuals that are put on trial are still guaranteed an attorney, if they so desire 
                                                        
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement.”). 
 158. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: 
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 301–02 (2007) (explaining that the 
discretion that immigration judges have in immigration law proceedings, specifically in asylum 
cases, are akin to a game of roulette).  “Bewildering,” “labyrinthine,” and “nebulous” are other 
similar terms that have been used to describe immigration laws.  Koh, supra note 7, at 1128; see 
also Derrick Moore, “Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude”: Why the Void for Vagueness Argument 
is Still Available and Meritorious, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 813, 814 (2008).  It is difficult to imagine 
expecting individuals typically unfamiliar with the language, culture, and legal system of the United 
States to grasp the intricacies of a complex field of law that eludes even those trained in its practice. 
 159. Koh, supra note 7, at 1153 (quoting STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA 
RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 113 (5th ed. 2009)). 
 160. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (noting a statute does not comply 
with due process if a person of ordinary intelligence does not have fair notice of what is prohibited, 
which leads to discriminatory enforcement). 
 161. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (stating “deportation is a drastic measure 
and at times the equivalent of banishment of exile . . . .  It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a 
residence in this country.  Such a forfeiture is a penalty . . . .  [T]he stakes are considerable for the 
individual”).  See also Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951) (stating the Court would 
analyze the application of the vagueness doctrine to a case involving an immigration provision due 
to “the grave nature of deportation”). 
 162. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (discussing that when there is no 
constitutional notice of illegal conduct, laws can be vague and “offend several important values”). 
 163. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). 
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one, to help them in navigating the complexities of the criminal proceedings.164  
However, when it comes to non-citizens, not only must they know what conduct 
violates criminal law, they must also know what criminal offenses trigger 
immigration sanctions.165  Thus, an added level of knowledge of the legal system 
is expected of individuals who may not have a grasp of the language, much less 
the legal system.  Additionally, there is absolutely no right to court-appointed 
counsel in removal proceedings,166 meaning that non-citizens who cannot afford 
their own representation are forced to enter the immigration minefield alone.  
These factors demonstrate, in part, the disadvantage challenging individuals who 
face, or are in the midst of, removal proceedings, and the necessity of having 
immigration provisions statutes that provide notice as to what offenses can 
trigger removal proceedings.167 
2. Substantial Arbitrary Enforcement 
Another especially problematic area in immigration proceedings is that of 
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.168  Immigration judges, as well as the 
officials that bring forth charges and initiate removal proceedings, are granted a 
vast amount of discretion. 169   Highlighting precisely that arbitrariness in 
immigration proceedings, Justice Kagan commented: “[a]n alien appearing 
before one official may suffer deportation; an identically situated alien appearing 
before another may gain the right to stay in the country.”170  Ensuring that 
immigration provisions are as straightforward as possible would help in 
constraining the risk of arbitrary enforcement that is prevalent in the field today.  
Given these additional concerns, that are generally non-existent with other 
                                                        
 164. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . 
. . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). 
 165. Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical 
Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1669, 1682–85 (2011) (describing the connection 
between a criminal conviction and initiations of immigration sanctions, including removal 
proceedings). 
 166. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012) (stating “[i]n any removal proceeding before an immigration judge 
. . . the person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the 
Government) by such counsel”). 
 167. Koh, supra note 7, at 1154–59 (discussing the “exceptional need for notice in the 
immigration context,” and providing other factors that further play into the need for a “strong 
vagueness analysis”). 
 168. Id. at 1160 (commenting that “[e]xtraordinary levels of arbitrariness [exists] when it 
comes to discretionary decision-making in immigration cases”); see also Jason A. Cade, Judging 
Immigration Equity: Deportation and Proportionality in the Supreme Court, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1029, 1071–75 (2017). 
 169. Koh, supra note 7, at 1160–62, 1164–65 (assessing the discretion that ICE prosecutors, 
officers and the immigration judges have in determining charges to be brought, and the decisions 
to be reached). 
 170. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 58, 64 (2011) (finding that a BIA policy violated the 
Administrative Procedures Act due to it being an “arbitrary and capricious” restriction on eligibility 
for relief from removal). 
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statutory provisions, non-citizens are disadvantaged in their due process rights 
in removal proceedings.171  Thus, it is crucial to apply the vagueness doctrine to 
immigration provisions to ensure compliance. 
C. Increase in Immigration Arrests and Deportation Heightens Risk of 
Possible Constitutional Violations in Removal Proceedings 
With the prevalence of constitutional concerns in immigration removal 
proceedings, the recent increase in arrests of non-citizens, and their deportations, 
over the past two administrations172 means that even more individuals will be 
affected by such an issue.  In 2017 alone, more than 211,000 immigrants had 
been deported,173 all of which would have been subjected to removal proceeding 
prior to deportation.  Specifically, between January 22 and September 2, 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested more than 28,000 
individuals.174  These arrests will eventually result in removal proceedings.175 
These numbers only indicate that a great many individuals will continue to be 
subjected to proceedings that are tainted by violations of their due process rights.  
It is imperative that any immigration provision be subjected to a critical analysis 
under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, along with any other doctrine that 
protects such constitutional rights.  By ensuring that immigration provisions 
abide by the requirement of notice and protection against arbitrary enforcement, 
the proceedings will not be marred by unconstitutional vagueness concerns.176 
                                                        
 171. Das, supra note 165, at 1728 (stating that immigration adjudications do not operate on a 
level playing field between the parties). 
 172. Nick Miroff, Deportations Fall under President Trump Despite Increase in Arrests by 
ICE, CHI. TRIB., (Sept. 28, 2017, 8:28 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-
trump-deportations-20170928-story.html. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id.  That increase is approximately three times higher than the number of immigrants 
arrested over the same time period in 2016.  See also Ted Hesson, Trump Deportations Lag behind 
Obama Levels, POLITICO (Aug. 8, 2017, 8:35 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/08/trump-deportations-behind-obama-levels-241420 
(explaining that although deportations have lagged, arrest rates and removal orders have increased). 
 175. Caitlin Dickerson, Immigration Arrests Rise Sharply as a Trump Mandate is Carried out, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/us/immigration-enforcement-
ice-arrests.html.  The article also notes that due to a backlog of immigration cases, many of the 
arrests had not yet triggered removal proceedings.  Id.  However, when they do undergo the 
proceedings, the possible violations of due process as a result of vague immigration provisions will 
still lurk.  Id.  Furthermore, the arrests themselves can result in detentions while the detainees await 
their hearings.  Das, supra note 165, at 1685.  In the meantime, the government has the ability to 
transfer the individuals to any number of facilities across the country, which may separate them 
from desperately needed legal counsel or records, further exacerbating due process concerns.  Id. 
at 1728. 
 176. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (stating that the doctrine of void-
for-vagueness is “a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play 
and settled rules of law” and that a statute which violates the doctrine “violates the first essential of 
due process”). 
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D. Examining Obstruction of Justice Outside the Immigration Realm 
Finally, it is beneficial to look to criminal statutes that involve obstruction of 
justice charges outside of the immigration realm.  These statutes could help 
inform the construction of the BIA’s definition of its own obstruction of justice 
statute.  It would also aid in determining which of the BIA’s previous definitions 
are more closely in line with obstruction of justice statutes from another area of 
law. 
The United States Code has an entire chapter on obstruction of justice 
charges. 177   An overview of the chapter shows there are many kinds of 
obstruction of justice offenses, each having related to a certain kind of crime.178  
One such obstruction statute is for obstruction of court orders, which states: 
Whoever, by threats or force, willfully prevents, obstructs, impedes, 
or interferes with, or willfully attempts to prevent, obstruct, impede, 
or interfere with, the due exercise of rights or the performance of 
duties under any order, judgment, or decree of a court of the United 
States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one 
year, or both.179 
By ensuring the statute specifically outlines what aspects of “justice” would 
need to be obstructed in order to be a crime, the United States Code has no issue 
of vagueness, or fair notice, and it does not allow for the possibility of arbitrary 
enforcement.  A reasonable person reading the statute would understand what 
actions would thus be in violation of the law.  This type of specificity should be 
sought in the BIA’s construction of “obstruction of justice.” 
III. THE TEMPORAL NEXUS REQUIREMENT CLARIFIES VAGUENESS 
This part offers up the “temporal nexus” requirement as an addition to the 
construction of “obstruction of justice” that could potentially alleviate the 
concerns of notice and arbitrary enforcement that are addressed by the void-for-
vagueness doctrine.  Despite the fact that the Ninth Circuit declined to hold that 
a temporal nexus requirement was necessary in the BIA’s In re Valenzuela 
Gallardo construction of “obstruction of justice,”180 such a requirement would 
resolve the unconstitutional vagueness issue. 
                                                        
 177. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521 (2012). 
 178. See id.  For example, § 1509 specifically relates to obstruction of a court order, while § 
1506 criminalizes theft or alteration of record of process, as well as false bail.  Id.  §§ 1506, 1509.  
These specified offenses lend credence to the argument that an obstruction of justice definition 
should be narrow, as opposed to broad. 
 179. Id. § 1509. 
 180. Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 822 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting “[t]he dissent 
reads our opinion as imposing a ‘temporal nexus requirement’ on the BIA’s definition of ‘crimes 
relating to obstruction of justice’ . . . .  It doesn’t.  We do not hold that the BIA’s definition of 
‘obstruction of justice’ must be tied to an ongoing proceeding.”). 
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A temporal nexus in this context would mean that, as in the Espinoza-
Gonzalez construction,181 an ongoing criminal trial or investigation would need 
to be taking place for the crime to constitute an “obstruction of justice” offense.  
Such a requirement would result in more context for the amorphous “process of 
justice,” resolving many of the issues that the Ninth Circuit had.182  Take for 
example, the federal crime of misprision of felony, which states: 
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony 
cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as 
soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person 
in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.183 
With a brief reading of the offense, a reasonable person would know that the 
crime of misprision of felony would not qualify as an “obstruction of justice” 
offense, if using the Espinoza-Gonzalez construction.184  The analysis of the 
actus reus element of interference with proceedings is simple; it is automatically 
not met because there is no requirement in the statute that the concealment of 
the felony be during an ongoing proceeding.185  The specific intent to interfere 
is met by the requirement of having knowledge of the felony and concealing it 
anyway. 
Thus, the notice requirement of the void-for-vagueness analysis is easily met.  
The addition of a temporal nexus provides crucial protection against arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement, which non-citizens are particularly susceptible 
to,186 because by requiring specific elements to be met, the determinations of the 
court will not have room for arbitrary variation in its holdings.  A construction 
similar to this, as a result of meeting both the requirements of the Due Process 
Clause, would have no issue passing the two-step void-for-vagueness analysis. 
In contrast, when applying the narrow “obstruction of justice” construction to 
the same misprision of felony offenses, the vagueness issues are stark.  The 
elimination of a temporal nexus to ongoing proceedings results in a lack of 
context for the phrase “process of justice.”187  One judge could determine that 
the “process of justice” begins as soon as the individual convicted of misprision 
                                                        
 181. In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889, 896 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 182. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 820 (stating the construction including “process of 
justice” did not provide sufficient enough standards that would enable a reasonable person to 
understand what offenses would be categorized as such). 
 183. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). 
 184. Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 892 (finding the BIA also concluded in its 
Espinoza-Gonzalez decision that such an offense did not qualify as “obstruction of justice,” using 
their very own construction of the phrase). 
 185. See 18 U.S.C. § 4. 
 186. See discussion supra Part B. 
 187. Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 838, 841 (noting the only requirement as outlined 
by the BIA was just the specific intent to interfere with “process of justice”). 
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of felony188 gained the knowledge of the actual commission of the knowledge.  
However, another judge could decide that the “process of justice” comes in to 
effect when police are called to the scene of the felony.189  The Supreme Court 
had similar concerns in its Johnson and Dimaya decisions, describing a scenario 
in which judges have different ideas as to what an “ordinary case” of attempted 
burglary looks like.190  A higher risk of arbitrary enforcement would be likely to 
abound.  Furthermore, if a well learned judicial official would have such 
different opinions as to the meaning of “process of justice,” it seems illogical to 
expect surety from foreigners of both this country and legal system. 
The temporal nexus would also satisfy the other concerns brought forth by the 
Supreme Court in its most recent decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, addressing a 
void-for-vagueness challenge to a statute. 191   The uncertainty and 
“indeterminacy” that arose in the statute ultimately caused the Court to hold that 
it was unconstitutionally vague.192  The addition of a temporal nexus to the 
“obstruction of justice” construction would result in no such uncertainty, it 
would clarify what an “ordinary case” would look like, and it would create the 
requirement that the crime be committed in connection to an ongoing 
proceeding. 193   Finally, by including a temporal nexus, the definition of 
                                                        
 188. 18 U.S.C. § 4. 
 189. See Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2011) (reasoning 
that yet another could hold that it wasn’t until the arrest of the individual who committed the felony 
that the “process of justice” begins).  The possibilities for such disparate determinations are 
numerous, and it is this very possibility of varying holdings from the judges that goes against the 
very nature of the Due Process Clause.  The Ninth Circuit in its Trung Thanh Hoang decision made 
a similar argument about the broadness of a different criminal offense, stating: 
A defendant could be convicted of rendering criminal assistance . . . if he provided 
transportation to an individual he knows is subject to a pending investigation or 
proceeding—but he could also be convicted if he provides transportation to an individual 
he knows has committed a crime, before any investigation or judicial proceeding has 
begun.  The state statute of conviction is divisible . . . .  Because [the statute] does not 
require the necessary actus reus, a violation of that statute is not categorically obstruction 
of justice. 
Id. 
 190. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1214 (2018) (reasoning “one judge, contemplating 
the ‘ordinary case,’ would imagine the ‘violent encounter’ apt to ensue when a ‘would-be burglar 
[was] spotted by a police officer [or] private security guard’ . . . .  Another judge would conclude 
that ‘any confrontation’ was more ‘likely to consist of [an observer’s] yelling “Who’s there?” . . . 
and the burglar’s running away’”). 
 191. Id. at 1216 (holding that a residual clause of an immigration statute should be struck down 
for being unconstitutionally vague by “unpredictability” and “arbitrariness”). 
 192. Id. at 1223.  See also Koh, supra note 7, at 1149 (explaining “the Court found that the 
residual clause reached a level of ‘indeterminacy’ that was not tolerable from a vagueness 
perspective.”). 
 193. This was also a concern that was noted by the Ninth Circuit.  See Valenzuela Gallardo v. 
Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 820 (9th Cir. 2016) (stating “[t]he BIA’s new construction leaves grave 
uncertainty about the plethora of steps and after an ‘ongoing criminal investigation or trial’ that 
comprise ‘the process of justice,’ and hence, uncertainty about which crimes constitute ‘obstruction 
of justice.’”). 
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“obstruction of justice” would be more akin to the obstruction of justice crimes 
that are found in the United States Code, which have no issue with due process 
comportment.194 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Immigrants have flocked to America’s shores for centuries and will continue 
to do so for years to come.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Due 
Process protections that are at the very heart of our Constitution apply to those 
immigrants, as well as citizens.  In the immigration system today, which can 
have such drastic consequences on the lives of individuals and their families, it 
is imperative that protections are applied.  Notice and arbitrary enforcement 
concerns permeate immigration removal proceedings and using the vagueness 
doctrine to rework unconstitutional immigration provisions would be a crucial 
step in applying Due Process protections to everyone.  Adding a temporal nexus 
to the BIA’s construction of “obstruction of justice” would be another measure 
that would aid such an endeavor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 194. See discussion supra Part D. 
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